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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the establishment of the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines in the late 1970s,1 one of the most important legal issues 
has been identifying what situations justify departure from the 
Guidelines.  In particular, a line of cases since the early 1980s has 
 
       †   J.D. Candidate, 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Government, 
2003, Liberty University. 
 1. 9 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES—
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 36.24 (3d ed. 2001). 
1
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considered the circumstances under which concealment of a body 
after a homicide can be an aggravating factor that justifies 
departure from the Guidelines.2  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
recently clarified this area of the law in State v. Leja.3  The court 
held that concealing a body could be an aggravating factor if the 
defendant either commits additional aggravating factors or uses 
personal knowledge about the location of the body to bargain for a 
more favorable sentence.4 
This Case Note examines an unexplored issue in the academic 
literature, which is whether the aggravating factor for concealment 
under the sentencing guidelines of many jurisdictions violates the 
right against self-incrimination.  This Case Note makes an initial 
contribution to this discussion by applying the current self-
incrimination precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
aggravating factor, as developed by the Minnesota courts in a line 
of cases leading up to Leja.5  This Case Note argues that 
Minnesota’s aggravating factor violates the constitutional right 
against self-incrimination.6  Part II of this Case Note explores the 
history of the Guidelines and legal precedents in Minnesota that 
deal with departure for concealment of a body.7  Part III examines 
the facts and the analysis provided by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in State v. Leja.8  Part IV applies the law of self-incrimination 
to Minnesota’s concealment aggravating factor and concludes that 
the aggravating factor violates the right against self-incrimination.9 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The History, Purpose, and Operation of the Guidelines 
Until the mid-1970s, all U.S. jurisdictions, including 
Minnesota, used sentencing systems that provided little detail about 
the specific sentences that judges should impose for felonies.10  Due 
 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004). 
 4. Id. at 449. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & 
JUST. 131, 141-42 (2005) (citing DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL 
2
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to this substantial flexibility, judges had almost unfettered 
discretion to impose sentences up to the statutory maximums.11  
The goal of this sentencing system was for judges to address each 
offender individually.12  In the mid-1970s, commentators criticized 
the flexibility of this sentencing system because they believed it 
produced unjust disparities in sentencing13 and often unduly 
lenient sentences.14 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many jurisdictions 
implemented laws to reduce judicial discretion by creating greater 
uniformity in sentencing.15  In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature 
established the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.16  Minnesota 
was the first jurisdiction in the United States to create mandatory 
sentencing guidelines administered by an independent 
commission, and many jurisdictions have since modeled their 
sentencing guidelines on the Minnesota Guidelines.17 
The Legislature created the Commission and the Guidelines to 
achieve consistency and proportionality in sentencing.18  The 
Sentencing Guidelines Grid is a matrix that judges use to calculate 
presumptive sentences for defendants.19  The grid assigns the 
presumptive duration of a sentence based on two factors: “criminal 
history”20 and “offense severity level.”21  The grid also assigns the 
 
SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 15-21 (1988) 
(discussing the judicial system prior to sentencing guidelines)). 
 11. Id. at 141. 
 12. See id. at 141-42. 
 13. Id. at 142 (“Some critics argued that the broad discretion exercised by 
judges and parole boards permitted substantial disparities in the sentencing of 
offenders convicted of similar crimes . . . .”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (citing 1 ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE 
SEARCH FOR REFORM 132-35 (1983)). 
 16. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 1, § 36.24. 
 17. Frase, supra note 10, at 131 (“Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to 
implement legally binding sentencing guidelines developed by an independent 
sentencing commission.  Minnesota’s guidelines have served as a model for other 
state guidelines reforms, and for revised American Bar Association and Model 
Penal Code sentencing standards . . . .”); see also 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(e) (2d ed. 1999) (“Since Minnesota first adopted 
presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1980, they have proved more popular . . . .  
By the mid-1990’s, well over a dozen states and the federal government had 
adopted sentencing guidelines and nearly as many were in the process of creating 
or studying them.”). 
 18. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
AND COMMENTARY § I (2004) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. 
 19. See generally id. § IV (Sentencing Guidelines Grid). 
 20. See generally id. § II.B (the criminal history index). 
3
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presumptive disposition of a sentence, which determines whether a 
judge must presumptively execute or stay a sentence.22 
A judge may depart from the Guidelines in two ways.  A 
durational departure occurs when a judge alters the presumptive 
duration of a sentence.23  The presumptive duration of a sentence 
is the range of months specified in the Guidelines within which a 
judge must sentence a felon.24  When a judge issues a sentence that 
is outside this range, the judge has made a durational departure 
from the Guidelines.25 
A dispositional departure occurs when a judge alters the 
presumptive disposition of a sentence.26  The departure occurs 
when a judge decides to impose intermediate sanctions, such as 
“probation, local incarceration, community work, treatment, [or] 
financial sanctions.”27  When a judge issues a disposition other than 
what the Guidelines specify, the judge has made a dispositional 
departure from the Guidelines.28 
The Commission and the Minnesota courts have established 
standards for judicial departure from the Guidelines.  To depart 
from the Guidelines, there must be “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” that justify the departure.29  A crime must be 
 
 21. See generally id. § II.A (the offense severity level). 
 22. Id. § II.C.  A presumptively executed sentence involves “commitment to 
state prisonment.”  Id. § IV.  A presumptively stayed sentence involves “up to a year 
in jail and/or other non-jail sanctions can be imposed as conditions of probation.”  
Id. 
 23. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 1, § 36.30. 
 24. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 1, 5 (2001) [hereinafter GUIDELINES BACKGROUND], available at 
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/background.pdf. 
 25. Id.  “In 1999, 11.6% of offenders sentenced to executed prison sentenced 
[sic] received aggravated (upward) durational departures; 25.5% received 
mitigated (downward) durational departures.”  Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id.  “In 1999, 4.7% of all felony offenders received an aggravated 
(upward) dispositional departure (10.4% of those recommended probation).”  Id.  
“In 1999, 12.9% of all cases (30.8% of those recommended prison), received a 
mitigated dispositional departure.”  Id. 
 29. E.g., State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn. 1998) (“[T]here must 
be ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ in the record to justify a departure.” 
(quoting Rairdon v. State, 577 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Minn. 1996))); see also 
GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § II.D (“The judge shall utilize the presumptive 
sentence provided in the sentencing guidelines unless the individual case involves 
substantial and compelling circumstances.  When such circumstances are present, 
the judge may depart from the presumptive sentence and stay or impose any 
sentence authorized by law.”). 
4
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unusual in severity compared to the normal type of crime at issue 
to depart from the Guideline’s presumptive sentences.30  A crime is 
unusual in severity if it involves aggravating or mitigating factors.31  
If a judge departs from the Guidelines, the sentence must still be 
proportional to the severity of the crime at issue.32  Departure from 
the Guidelines must be infrequent33 because too many departures 
will undermine the purpose of the Guidelines.34 
B.  Concealment of a Victim’s Body and Durational Departure 
Minnesota courts have considered whether concealment of a 
victim’s body after a homicide justifies upward departure from the 
Guidelines since the early 1980s.  The first case that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court decided on this issue was State v. Shiue.35  In that 
case, the defendant kidnapped three people, including a six-year-
old boy.36  The defendant killed the young boy shortly after 
 
 30. See State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn. 1999) (requiring 
consideration of whether the conduct was “significantly more or less serious than 
that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question” (quoting State 
v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn. 1983))); see also State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641, 
643 (Minn. 1984) (“The general issue . . . is whether the defendant’s conduct was 
significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of 
the crime in question.”). 
 31. E.g., Spain, 590 N.W.2d at 88 (“[A] sentencing court has no discretion to 
depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravating or mitigating factors are 
present.”).  The list of factors that will justify departure from the Guidelines is not 
exclusive.  Id. at 89.  “In most cases, where upward departures have been sustained, 
more than one factor is present.”  MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 1, § 36.30. 
 32. GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § II.D (When departing from the presumptive 
sentence, “the court should pronounce a sentence which is proportional to the 
severity of the offense of conviction”); Spain, 590 N.W.2d at 89 (“When a 
sentencing court departs from the presumptive sentence, it must still strive to 
determine a sentence that is proportional to the severity of the offense.”). 
 33. See State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981) (stating that 
reasons for departure exist in only “a small number of cases”); see also GUIDELINES, 
supra note 18, § II.D cmt. II.D.01 (“The guideline sentences are presumed to be 
appropriate for every case.  However, there will be a small number of cases where 
substantial and compelling aggravating or mitigating factors are present.”). 
 34. GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § II.D cmt. II.D.03 (“The purposes of the 
sentencing guidelines cannot be achieved unless the presumptive sentences are 
applied with a high degree of regularity.”); Spain, 590 N.W.2d at 88 (“The 
purposes of the sentencing guidelines will not be served if the trial courts 
generally fail to apply the presumptive sentences found in the guidelines.”); 
Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d at 487 (“[T]he purposes of the law will not be served if 
judges fail to follow the guidelines in the ‘general’ case.”). 
 35. 326 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982). 
 36. Id. at 649. 
5
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kidnapping him, and he concealed the body.37  The other two 
victims later escaped and reported the defendant to the police, who 
arrested him soon after.38  The defendant revealed the location of 
the victim’s body only after the County Attorney agreed not to 
charge him with first-degree murder.39  A jury found the defendant 
guilty of kidnapping and second-degree murder.40  The district 
court departed from the Guidelines, citing six aggravating factors, 
including concealment of the victim’s body.41 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
concealment of a body is an aggravating factor that justifies an 
upward durational departure from the Guidelines for three 
reasons.42  First, concealment of the victim’s body causes severe 
emotional harm to the victim’s family members because they are 
unaware of the victim’s location and well-being.43  Second, an 
increased sentence is necessary to deter defendants from using 
their personal knowledge about the location of the body to bargain 
for a reduced sentence.44  The court believed the risk of a higher 
sentence would compel the defendant’s attorney or the authorities 
to inform the defendant about the risks of not revealing the 
location of the body.45  Third, concealment of a body is an 
aggravating factor in other jurisdictions.46  Thus, the court found 
that concealment of a body should be an aggravating factor in 
Minnesota.47 
In State v. Schmit, the Minnesota Supreme Court carved out a 
potential exception to its prior holding in Shiue.48  In Schmit, the 
 
 37. See id. at 650-51. 
 38. Id. at 650. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 652. 
 41. Id. at 654.  The trial court cited six grounds for upward durational 
departure: (1) vulnerability of the victim, (2) no provocation by the victim, (3) the 
victim being treated with particular cruelty, (4) a prior felony offense involving the 
victim, (5) planning and concealment, and (6) prior break ins, which negated the 
defendant’s lack of felony record.  Id. 
 42. Id. at 655. 
 43. See id. (“For five months, [the victim’s] family suffered a great deal of 
trauma, not knowing whether their son was dead or alive.”). 
 44. See id.  
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. (citing People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. 1971); Gardner v. State, 
388 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ind. 1979)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1983). 
6
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defendant murdered his wife in her sleep.49  He then concealed her 
body in an area near some train tracks.50  After his arrest, he did 
not use the hidden body to bargain for a lower sentence.51  A jury 
found him guilty of “first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter.”52  
The district court departed based on a few factors, including 
concealment, and the supreme court affirmed two of the factors for 
departure.53  In a footnote, the court stated “[b]ecause defendant 
made no effort to bargain with information concerning the 
location of the body, his concealment of the body does not operate 
as an aggravating factor in sentencing.”54  Therefore, the Schmit 
court limited Shiue to situations where a defendant bargains for a 
lower sentence.55 
Following Schmit, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied 
Shiue and Schmit to a series of homicide cases.56  In State v. 
Shoebottom, the defendant shot his wife after she handed him a gun 
and dared him to shoot her.57  He then burned her body and 
concealed the remains.58  He only revealed the location of the 
remains after the County Attorney agreed not to charge him with 
first-degree murder.59  The district court departed from the 
sentencing guidelines exclusively because of the concealment of 
the body.60  The court of appeals affirmed the departure and held 
that the facts were similar to Shiue, because the defendant had 
bargained and concealed the body, which remained hidden for a 
long period.61 
In State v. Jackson, the defendant hired a prostitute and 
 
 49. Id. at 56. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 58 n.1. 
 52. Id. at 56. 
 53. Id. at 58.  The supreme court affirmed because (1) there was more time 
separating the events than in a normal crime of this type, and (2) there was an 
abuse of a relationship of trust.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 58 n.1 (citing State v. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982)). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See, e.g., State v. Murr, 443 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Johnston, 390 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Jackson, 370 N.W.2d 72 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Shoebottom, 355 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984). 
 57. 355 N.W.2d at 773-74. 
 58. Id. at 774. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
7
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strangled her.62  He then concealed the body and destroyed the 
prostitute’s identifying information.63  The district court departed 
from the Guidelines and the court of appeals affirmed the 
departure based on three aggravating factors, including 
concealment.64  The court of appeals held that departure was 
justified even without bargaining, because the defendant attempted 
to hinder identification of the body in addition to concealing the 
body.65 
In State v. Johnston, the defendant beat the victim to death and 
then attempted to dispose of the body in a nearby dumpster.66  A 
jury convicted him of second-degree felony murder,67 and the 
district court departed from sentencing guidelines based on five 
aggravating factors, including concealment of the body.68  The 
court of appeals held that under Schmit, departure for concealment 
could not be justified, because the defendant did not bargain.69  
The court held that Jackson did not apply, because the defendant 
did not attempt to conceal the identity of the victim.70  However, 
the court concluded that concealment still justified departure 
based on the “particular cruelty” of the crime.71 
In State v. Murr, the defendant killed his father after he was 
told to move out.72  The defendant then concealed the body in a 
shallow grave at Death Valley National Park where coyotes 
mutilated it.73  Concealment of the body was the only factor cited 
 
 62. 370 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  The court of appeals affirmed based on three aggravating factors: (1) 
the vulnerability of the victim, (2) the particular cruelty of the crime, and (3) the 
concealment of the victim’s body.  Id. 
 65. Id. (“The fact that Jackson did not attempt to negotiate a deal through his 
knowledge of the location of the victim’s body does not prevent the use of 
concealment in this case as an aggravating factor because, here, concealment was 
coupled with other attempts at concealing the victim’s identification.”). 
 66. 390 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 67. Id. at 452. 
 68. Id. at 456.  The district court cited five aggravating factors: (1) prior 
convictions for personal injury, (2) particular vulnerability of victim, (3) particular 
cruelty of crime, (4) crime happened in victim’s zone of privacy, and (5) 
concealment of victim’s body.  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed all aggravating 
factors cited by the trial court except numbers two and four.  Id. at 457. 
 69. Id. at 456 (citing State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1983)).  
The court explicitly noted that “appellant did not attempt such a bargain.”  Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 456-57. 
 72. 443 N.W.2d 833, 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 73. Id. 
8
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for an upward departure.74  The court of appeals held that Schmit 
prohibited departure for concealment alone without bargaining.75  
The court cited Jackson because mutilation of the body hindered its 
identification.76  The court also cited Johnston to justify departure 
for concealment because it demonstrated the “particular cruelty” of 
the crime.77 
In the late 1990s, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on two 
more concealment cases.  In both cases, the court affirmed a 
departure where concealment of a body was one of a few 
aggravating factors.  In State v. Folkers, the defendant killed his 
girlfriend in his garage, put her body in her van, and abandoned 
the van in a parking lot.78  The court affirmed the departure based 
on three factors, including the “particular cruelty” of concealing 
the body.79  In State v. Griller, the defendant killed the victim and 
buried the body in his backyard.80  The court affirmed the 
departure based on four factors, including concealment of the 
body.81  In both cases, the court affirmed concealment as one of a 
few factors and cited Shiue but provided no analysis justifying a 
departure without bargaining.82 
Other jurisdictions have also considered whether concealment 
of a body justifies departure from their respective sentencing 
guidelines.  No consensus exists on the issue among the various 
jurisdictions.  Indiana,83 Louisiana,84 Tennessee,85 and the Ninth 
 
 74. Id. at 836. 
 75. See id. at 836-37 (“There is some merit to Murr’s position that 
concealment alone may not support an aggravated sentence.”). 
 76. Id. at 837 (“[T]he method of concealment . . . may still be considered. . . . 
Identification of the body could be accomplished only through dental records; no 
other items of identification were present.”). 
 77. Id. (“Murr’s transportation of his father’s body in the trunk of his car, 
combined with the manner of concealment of the body that lead to its mutilation 
by coyotes, relate to the ‘particular cruelty’ with which the murder was 
committed.”). 
 78. 581 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Minn. 1998). 
 79. Id. at 327.  The supreme court affirmed three factors supporting 
departure: (1) concealment of the body, (2) lack of remorse, and (3) blaming the 
murder on another person.  Id. 
 80. 583 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (Minn. 1998). 
 81. Id. at 744.  The supreme court affirmed four factors supporting 
departure: (1) concealment of the body, (2) particular cruelty, (3) lack of 
remorse, and (4) shifting the blame.  Id. 
 82. Compare Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 744 n.29 (citing Shiue with no reasoning), 
with Folkers, 581 N.W.2d at 327 (citing Shiue with no reasoning). 
 83. Gardner v. State, 388 N.E.2d 513, 518-19 (Ind. 1979) (holding that it was 
not unreasonable for the trial court to depart based in part on the defendant’s 
9
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Circuit86 have held that concealment can be an aggravating factor.  
Other jurisdictions such as Florida87 and Washington88 have 
prohibited or restricted use of concealment as an aggravating 
factor. 
III.  STATE V. LEJA 
A.  The Facts 
Tina DeAnn Leja was involved in an abusive relationship with 
Darnell Smith.89  When Leja received a phone call from Bobby Dee 
Holder, Darnell ordered Leja to tell Holder that Darnell was not at 
home and that Holder could come over.90  Darnell wanted Holder 
to come over because he believed that Holder wanted to have sex 
with Leja.91  When Holder came over, Darnell and his younger 
brother Chaka beat and shot Holder, killing him.92  Darnell and 
 
concealment of a body and destruction of evidence). 
 84. State v. Williams, 633 So. 2d 309, 310 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it departed in part for 
concealment of a body). 
 85. State v. Gordon, No. 03C01-9207-CR-234, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 
162, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 1993) (holding that concealment of a 
body amounts to an aggravating factor). 
 86. United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that destroying and concealing a body after a voluntary manslaughter is an 
aggravating factor). 
 87. State v. McCall, 524 So. 2d 663, 665 n.1 (Fla. 1988) (“[M]utilation of a 
body subsequent to death does not indicate the killing itself was excessively brutal 
and therefore cannot be a valid basis for departure.”); Jackson v. State, 451 So. 2d 
458, 463 (Fla. 1984) (“Actions after the death of the victim are irrelevant in 
determining this aggravating circumstance.”) (citation omitted); Herzog v. State, 
439 So. 2d 1372, 1380 (Fla. 1983) (“As to the trial court’s finding that the disposal 
of the body is a factor that can be considered in determining heinousness, we have 
held that this evidence is irrelevant on this issue.”) (citations omitted); Simmons v. 
State, 419 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 1982) (holding that concealing a body through 
burning provides no support for an aggravating factor); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 
1103, 1109 (Fla. 1981) (“[O]nce the victim dies, the crime of murder was 
completed . . . .”); Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557, 561 (Fla. 1975) (“[W]hen 
Arnold Tresch died, the crime of murder was completed and . . . the mutilation of 
the body many hours later was not primarily the kind of misconduct contemplated 
by the Legislature in providing for the consideration of aggravating 
circumstances.”). 
 88. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text. 
 89. State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Minn. 2004). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 445. 
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Chaka then cut up the body and placed the parts in a cooler.93  The 
next day, Darnell ordered Leja to dispose of the body and told her 
that Andre Parker would monitor her.94  Leja and Parker then 
proceeded to dispose of Holder’s car and body in Wisconsin and 
northern Minnesota.95  About a month later, police arrested and 
charged all of the people involved in the murder and disposal of 
Holder’s remains.96 
B.  Procedural History 
A jury found Leja guilty of second-degree felony murder.97  In 
sentencing Leja, the trial court departed from the Guidelines citing 
“concealment” and “abuse of a position of trust” as aggravating 
factors.98  The court imposed a sentence of 210 months, which was 
an upward departure of 60 months from the presumptive 
sentence.99 
The court of appeals considered whether departure from the 
Guidelines for concealment requires bargaining by the defendant 
with the authorities.100  The court cited two reasons for affirming 
the district court on this issue.101  First, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court affirmed departures in Folkers and Griller, even though 
neither of the defendants in those cases used concealment to 
bargain for a more favorable sentence.102  Second, the court cited 
its own precedent in Murr where it held that concealment could 
justify departure for particular cruelty even in the absence of 
bargaining.103 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 445-46. 
 96. Id. at 443, 446-47.  Darnell Smith was convicted of first-degree 
premeditated murder.  Id. at 443.  Chaka Smith pled guilty to second-degree 
felony murder.  Id.   Andre Parker pled guilty to aiding an offender after the fact.  
Id. 
 97. Id. at 447.  Leja was convicted of accomplice-after-the-fact, but the court 
of appeals vacated that conviction.  Id.  She was also convicted of aiding assault in 
the second degree, but that conviction was never addressed on appeal.  Id. at 447 
n.1. 
 98. Id. at 447. 
 99. Id. 
 100. State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), modified, 684 
N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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C.  The Findings of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court only considered whether Leja’s 
concealment of the body presented “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” that justified upward departure from the 
Guidelines.104  The court held that the facts in this case did not 
meet this standard.105  The Schmit case led the court to conclude 
that the policy rationales from Shiue did not apply, because Leja 
never bargained for a favorable sentence.106  The court 
distinguished Folkers and Griller, where it held that concealment of a 
body was an aggravating factor without bargaining,107 by explaining 
that many factors justified departure in those cases, and 
concealment was not the exclusive factor justifying departure.108  
The court concluded that Leja’s conduct was not “substantial and 
compelling,” and modified the sentence to the presumptive 
duration level.109 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Minnesota’s Concealment Aggravating Factor 
Under Minnesota law, concealment is an aggravating factor in 
certain situations.  In Shiue, it seemed like concealment might 
always be an aggravating factor.110  In Schmit, the supreme court 
limited the aggravating factor to situations where a defendant 
bargains.111  The court of appeals technically followed Schmit in the 
 
 104. Leja, 684 N.W.2d at 447-48.  The State argued that “abuse of position of 
trust” was an aggravating factor before the district court, but did not advance this 
argument on appeal.  Id. at 447. 
 105. Id. at 450. 
 106. See id. at 449 (“These independent policy concerns are not present 
here.”). 
 107. Id. (“In State v. Folkers and State v. Griller . . . there had been no effort to 
use the body’s location to negotiate a more favorable charge.” (citing State v. 
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 744 n.9 (Minn. 1998); State v. Folkers, 581 N.W.2d 321, 
327 (Minn. 1998))). 
 108. Id. (“We have not decided a case where concealment, standing alone, was 
cited approvingly as a sufficient aggravating factor supporting an upward 
departure.”). 
 109. Id. at 450 (“Leja’s participation in the concealment of Holder’s remains, 
without more such as her bargaining with the authorities, does not support an 
upward durational departure.”). 
 110. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
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cases that followed.112  In practice, the court of appeals may have 
circumvented Schmit by justifying departure for concealment in the 
absence of bargaining based on particular cruelty.113  In the late 
1990s, the supreme court moved away from Schmit in Folkers and 
Griller when it held, without explanation, that concealment justified 
departure in the absence of bargaining.114  The supreme court may 
have been following the “particular cruelty” rationale for departure 
that the court of appeals had previously adopted.115 
The supreme court attempted to reconcile these conflicting 
precedents in Leja when it held that two situations justify departure 
for concealment.  First, departure can be justified if the defendant 
uses the location of the victim’s body to bargain for a favorable 
sentence.116  Second, departure can be justified if the defendant 
commits other aggravating factors in addition to concealment.117 
B.  The Historical Origin and Purpose of the Privilege 
The privilege against self-incrimination originated in the 
English common law.118  In the early eighteenth-century, common 
law courts established a general right against self-incrimination, 
which gave defendants the right not to testify about incriminating 
information in civil or criminal cases.119  Some American colonies 
modeled the common law right against self-incrimination.120  Eight 
states had a right against self-incrimination in their constitutions 
prior to the ratification of the Fifth Amendment.121  Because there 
is little “helpful legislative history” relating to the Fifth 
Amendment,122 the Supreme Court has operated on the 
 
 112. See supra notes 69, 75 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra notes 65, 71, 77 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 115. See State v. Folkers, 581 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 1998) (“Folkers treated 
the victim with particular cruelty in that he attempted to conceal her body . . . .”). 
 116. See State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Minn. 2004) (“[I]f concealment 
was not considered an aggravating factor, the accused would be able to use the 
concern of the victim’s family to negotiate a favorable plea agreement in return 
for disclosing the location of the victim’s body.”). 
 117. See id. at 449 (“We note, however, that the upward durational departures 
in both Folkers and Griller were based on multiple aggravating factors, of which 
concealment of the body was but a single factor.”). 
 118. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.14(b) (3d ed. 2000). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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assumption that the framers adopted the privilege as it existed at 
common law.123 
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions contain 
identically worded provisions that protect against self-
incrimination.124  The Supreme Court has cited many purposes for 
the right against self-incrimination.125  Protection of the adversarial 
system is one of the primary functions of the privilege.126  The 
American legal system assumes that a contested process, where the 
State must prove the guilt of the defendant before a neutral judge, 
is the best means to determine whether a defendant is guilty.127  
The use of independent evidence instead of coercion is important 
to the effectiveness of this process.128 
C.  The Elements of Self-Incrimination 
The Supreme Court has held that a state action violates the 
 
 123. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 674 n.5 (1998) (“What we know of 
the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, however, 
gives no indication that the Framers had any sense of a privilege more 
comprehensive than common law practice then revealed.”). 
 124. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 125. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).  
The Supreme Court has offered the following rationales for the privilege: 
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: 
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an 
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our 
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane 
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates “a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual 
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the 
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire 
load,”; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of 
the right of each individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a 
private life,”; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our 
realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is 
often “a protection to the innocent.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 126. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (“[O]urs is an 
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a system in which the State must 
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by 
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.”). 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
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right against self-incrimination when three elements are present.129  
“There must be (1) compulsion of a (2) testimonial 
communication that is (3) incriminating.”130  The following 
discussion will examine whether Minnesota’s use of concealment as 
an aggravating factor satisfies these elements. 
1.  The Compulsion Element 
The Supreme Court has held that any state-created penalty 
that punishes a person for remaining silent about incriminating 
information is compulsion.131  The term “penalty” has a broad 
meaning that includes the imposition of any sanction that makes 
silence “costly.”132  A person may be compelled to provide 
incriminating testimony only if that person is offered complete 
immunity from any future criminal penalty that might result from 
revealing the information.133 
Any state-imposed penalty for exercising the right against self-
incrimination is prima facie unconstitutional.134  A person normally 
must assert the right against self-incrimination if the State requests 
testimony that is reasonably incriminating.135  The Supreme Court 
has held that this principle does not apply if a person will suffer a 
 
 129. United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979); see also 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment . . . 
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial 
Communication that is incriminating.”). 
 130. Authement, 607 F.2d at 1131 (citation omitted). 
 131. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[A] State may 
not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth 
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.”); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (“The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state 
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal 
infringement--the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in 
the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such 
silence.”). 
 132. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967).  The privilege prohibits any 
form of “compulsion,” and it is not limited to “economic sanctions” or 
“imprisonment.”  Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 806. 
 133. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1973) (“Immunity is required if 
there is to be ‘rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege 
and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.’”) 
(quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972)); United States v. 
Lawson, 255 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Minn. 1966) (“Where a statute forces the 
individual to choose between answering or being punished for invoking the 
privilege, without at the same time granting a complete immunity, then it becomes 
unconstitutional.”). 
 134. See Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805-07. 
 135. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984). 
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state-imposed penalty for exercising the privilege because a penalty 
forecloses the possibility of free assertion of the privilege.136  If a 
person reveals incriminating information under either an express 
or implied threat of a State-imposed penalty, the person has not 
waived the privilege, and the State would be unable to use any 
incriminating testimony in future criminal proceedings.137 
An upward departure for concealment of a body is a penalty 
that compels testimony.  Many jurisdictions have correctly held that 
imposition of a higher sentence for exercising the privilege is an 
unconstitutional penalty.138  Making something an aggravating 
factor empowers judges to issue stronger penalties.  Thus, the 
aggravating factor for concealment is a penalty for the act of 
concealment.  Assuming that the other elements are satisfied, the 
aggravating factor for concealment would be prima facie 
unconstitutional, because the accused has not waived the privilege 
if there is a penalty for silence.139  The State would not be able to 
use any incriminating evidence obtained through this aggravating 
factor in a future criminal proceeding.140 
2.  The Testimonial Communication Element 
The testimonial communication element includes any 
information that a person communicates to the State.141  The 
 
 136. Id. at 434; see also Turley, 414 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that “[a] waiver 
secured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be termed 
voluntary”). 
 137. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(“[A] defendant does not have ‘a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to 
answer’ if he knows he will be incarcerated for a longer period of time if he does 
not make the incriminating statements.  The touchstone of the fifth amendment is 
compulsion, and the Supreme Court has recognized that imprisonment is one of a 
wide variety of penalties which can serve to trigger a constitutional violation.”); 
United States v. Heubel, 864 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]here a 
defendant invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
in a timely manner, a sentencing court may not use his or her failure to waive that 
right as negative evidence to penalize him or her in deciding upon the 
appropriate sentence.”); State v. Shreves, 60 P.3d 991, 996 (Mont. 2002) (“[W]e 
cannot uphold a sentence that is based on a refusal to admit guilt . . . .  Therefore, 
we hold that the District Court improperly penalized Shreves for maintaining his 
innocence pursuant to his constitutional right to remain silent.”). 
 139. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966) (“A nod or 
headshake is as much a ‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ act in this sense as are 
spoken words.  But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts 
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method of communication is irrelevant, because all forms of 
communication are included.142  This element primarily excludes 
any evidence the State does not obtain through communication by 
the defendant.  For example, the Supreme Court has held that 
collecting physical evidence from a person’s body is not a 
testimonial communication.143 
Punishing a defendant for failure to reveal the location of a 
concealed body is a testimonial communication.  Two questions 
will help to clarify why revealing the location of the body is a 
testimonial communication.  First, under what circumstances does 
an aggravating factor for concealment compel a testimonial 
communication?  Second, is the act of producing a body a 
testimonial communication even though the body is physical 
evidence? 
a.  Conditional Versus Unconditional Penalties 
Determining when an aggravating factor for concealment 
compels a testimonial communication requires one to examine 
what the State is punishing.  There are two possibilities.  The State 
may be unconditionally punishing a defendant exclusively for the 
act of concealing a body.  A punishment is unconditional if the 
State does not link the punishment to the defendant’s willingness 
to reveal the location of the body.144  On the other hand, the State 
may be conditionally punishing the defendant for the act of 
concealing the body.  A punishment is conditional if the State links 
the defendant’s punishment to the willingness of the defendant to 
reveal the location of the body.145 
An unconditional aggravating factor for concealment would 
not fall within the testimonial communication element.  With this 
aggravating factor, the State would be punishing the defendant but 
would not be directing the punishment at a failure to 
communicate.  The right against self-incrimination is passive, 
meaning simply that there should be no penalty for silence.  The 
 
noncommunicative in nature . . . .”). 
 142. Id. at 763-64. 
 143. See id. at 764.  For example, the Supreme Court held in Schmerber that 
“blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was 
neither petitioner’s testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or 
writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.”  Id. at 765. 
 144. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 145. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
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privilege by definition cannot protect the act of concealing a body, 
because concealment is an affirmative step.  Actions like concealing 
evidence or driving at illegal speeds to evade arrest are both 
affirmative actions that the privilege does not protect even though 
the inability to do both might create a higher risk of incrimination.  
Unconditionally punishing the action of concealing a body is a 
legitimate means of punishing socially undesirable conduct. 
In contrast, a conditional aggravating factor for failure to 
reveal the location of a body would fall within the testimonial 
communication element.  With this aggravating factor, the State 
would be telling the defendant that failure to testify about the 
location of the body would result in a higher sentence.  The State 
would be punishing the defendant for passively remaining silent.  
The conditional aggravating factor for concealment thus creates a 
penalty for failure to testify. 
Precedent from the Washington state courts supports the 
distinction between conditional and unconditional aggravating 
factors for concealment.146  The Washington cases are particularly 
persuasive because Washington, like Minnesota, requires 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” to justify departure 
from its sentencing guidelines.147  In State v. Crutchfield, the 
Washington Court of Appeals held that “by ruling that 
concealment can be an aggravating factor, we would be holding 
that the defendant who exercises his constitutional right not to 
incriminate himself by refusing to reveal the location of the victim’s 
body, has thereby operated to increase his own punishment.”148  
The Washington Court of Appeals clarified Crutchfield in State v. 
Rich, holding that “[b]ecause a person has a constitutional right 
not to incriminate himself, the court cannot rely on the 
defendant’s failure to reveal the location of a victim’s body as an 
aggravating factor.  But a defendant’s affirmative steps to conceal a 
crime can support an exceptional sentence.”149 
 
 146. State v. Crutchfield, 771 P.2d 746 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
 147. Compare Crutchfield, 771 P.2d at 750 (“[T]he reviewing court must 
independently determine whether, as a matter of law, the trial court’s reasons 
justify an exceptional sentence.  There must be ‘substantial and compelling’ 
reasons for imposing such a sentence.” (citations omitted)), with State v. Leja, 684 
N.W.2d 442, 448 (Minn. 2004) (“[T]here must be ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ in the record to justify a departure.” (citations omitted)). 
 148. 771 P.2d at 752. 
 149. No. 28342-5-II, 2003 Wash. Ct. App. LEXIS 1387, at *11-12 (Wash. Ct. 
App. July 8, 2003) (citations omitted).  State v. Vaughn provides more authority for 
the distinction between conditional and unconditional departures for 
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A Ninth Circuit case, Dallas v. Arave, provides further support 
for the distinction between a conditional and unconditional 
aggravating factor.150  In Dallas, the State accused the defendant of 
killing two Idaho game wardens and concealing their bodies.151  
The jury found the defendant guilty of two manslaughters and 
concealment.152  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had to determine 
whether the concealment conviction violated the defendant’s right 
against self-incrimination.153  The court noted that although the 
district court relied on the defendant’s refusal to reveal the 
location of the body, it cited sufficient other reasons related 
directly to the act of concealment to justify the conviction 
independent of the failure to disclose the location afterward.154  
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not primarily base 
the conviction on the defendant’s refusal to testify against his own 
interests.155 
 
concealment.  See 924 P.2d 27, 32-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).  In Vaughn, the court 
of appeals affirmed a district court departure for a crime where the defendant 
took “affirmative steps” to conceal the crime, including hiding evidence and 
creating an alibi.  Id. at 33.  The court held that the departure did not violate the 
defendant’s right against self-incrimination.  Id.  It found that Vaughn was distinct 
from Crutchfield because the defendant’s failure to reveal the location of the body 
was the reason for departure in Crutchfield, but the defendant’s affirmative steps to 
conceal the crime were the justification for departure in Vaughn.  Id. 
 150. 984 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 151. Id. at 294. 
 152. Id. at 294-95.  The conviction for concealment was an independent crime 
and not an aggravating factor for the manslaughter convictions.  See id.  The case 
does not cite the specific statute that the defendant violated, but it was probably 
the following statute: 
Every person who, knowing that any . . . object, matter or thing, is about 
to be produced, used or discovered as evidence upon any trial, 
proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully 
destroys, alters or conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it 
from being produced, used or discovered, is guilty of a misdemeanor 
. . . . 
IDAHO CODE § 18-2603 (2005). 
 153. Dallas, 984 F.2d at 297.  The court seemed to treat the defendant’s appeal 
with skepticism because “[t]he privilege must be invoked in a timely fashion . . . 
[and the defendant] did not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege until he raised 
it on appeal.”  Id.  The court may have relied on an incorrect understanding of the 
law when making this point, because this was probably a penalty situation where 
assertion of the privilege was unnecessary.  See supra notes 135-36 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. Dallas, 984 F.2d at 297. 
 155. Id.  The court affirmed part of the reasoning of the district court when it 
held that the defendant “could have let someone know the location of the grave 
once he was ‘free or had been removed from the scene and had not been 
discovered.’”  Id.  This part of the court’s reasoning is problematic.  Although it is 
19
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These cases support the distinction between conditional and 
unconditional punishments.  In Crutchfield, the aggravating factor 
violated the right against self-incrimination because it conditionally 
punished the defendant for not revealing the location of the 
body.156  In Rich, the aggravating factor did not violate the right 
against self-incrimination because it was an unconditional penalty 
only for affirmative steps taken by the defendant to conceal the 
body.157  In Dallas, the Ninth Circuit concluded, at least implicitly, 
that requiring a defendant to tell the State about the location of a 
body would be a testimonial communication, but punishing the 
defendant directly for the act of concealing the body would not.158  
The aggravating factor does not penalize a testimonial 
communication if the State directs the punishment at the 
affirmative action of concealment, but if the State directs the 
punishment at a failure to reveal the location of a body it is 
compelling a testimonial communication. 
The current law in Minnesota coerces defendants into 
testimonial communication by punishing defendants conditionally 
under the aggravating factor of concealment.  The Shiue case 
offered two rationales for making concealment an aggravating 
factor under Minnesota law.159  First, families suffer emotional harm 
from the concealment of a body.160  The court pointed out that 
“[f]or five months, Jason Wilkman’s family suffered a great deal of 
trauma, not knowing whether their son was dead or alive.”161  
Similarly, in Murr, the court concluded that concealment of the 
body “caused Theodore Murr’s family great anguish to be without 
knowledge of his whereabouts for more than seven weeks.”162 
The status of the emotional harm rationale under Minnesota 
law is unclear.  The Leja majority opinion mentioned both 
rationales but only discussed the deterring bargain rationale.163  
The dissent complained about the failure of the majority to address 
 
theoretically possible for a defendant to reveal the location of the body without 
incrimination, the State would still be coercing a testimonial communication and 
any method that the defendant could use to reveal the information would 
probably carry an unreasonable risk of self-incrimination. 
 156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 161. State v. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. 1982). 
 162. State v. Murr, 443 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 163. State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Minn. 2004). 
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the emotional harm rationale.164  There is, however, reason to 
believe that this rationale is still valid under Minnesota law.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court did not explicitly reverse this rationale, 
and it may be the justification for departure in situations where 
there is no bargaining. 
The emotional harm rationale suggests that the courts are 
punishing defendants conditionally based on their willingness to 
reveal the location of a body.  Imagine if a court issued a higher 
sentence to a defendant because he inflicted emotional harm on 
the victim’s family throughout the trial by refusing to plead guilty 
at the beginning of the trial.  There is little difference between this 
seemingly extreme example and the emotional harm rationale.  
The courts in both Murr and Shiue mentioned the specific length of 
time that the families suffered emotional harm because of the 
defendants’ failure to reveal the location of the bodies.165  It would 
be acceptable to punish a defendant for concealing a body.  
However, punishing a defendant for the ongoing emotional harm 
that families suffer is a conditional punishment for failure to reveal 
the location of a body because confessing would be the only way 
that the defendant could stop the clock from running. 
The second reason offered by the court in Shiue was the 
deterring bargaining rationale.166  The court noted that the 
defendant “negotiated an agreement to disclose the whereabouts of 
the body in exchange for an agreement to forego prosecution for 
first-degree murder.  Other accused persons could view this as an 
appropriate tool in negotiating a plea.”167  Similarly, in Shoebottom, 
the court cited the defendant’s bargaining with the authorities 
about the location of the victim’s body as a rationale for 
departure.168  This rationale for departure is legitimate post-Leja, 
because the court in Leja specifically applied the bargaining 
rationale.169 
The deterring-bargaining rationale also suggests that the 
 
 164. Id. at 457 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting) (“After recognizing that this was a 
‘gruesome crime’ involving ‘particular cruelty’ and that Leja’s actions were 
‘reprehensible,’ it is inconceivable that the majority could find that her conduct 
fails to reach the threshold of substantial and compelling circumstances needed to 
justify an upward durational departure.”). 
 165. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 167. State v. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. 1982). 
 168. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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courts are punishing defendants conditionally.  As has already been 
discussed, defendants have the right to remain silent about 
incriminating information.  Therefore, the State has two options.  
Its first option is to allow the defendant to remain silent.  Its second 
option is to create incentives for the defendant to waive the 
privilege freely like plea-bargaining.  The defendant has a right to 
any promise that the State offers in exchange for waiving the 
privilege because the defendant only waives the privilege on 
condition that the defendant will receive the benefit of the bargain. 
The deterring-bargaining rationale operates as a penalty for 
silence because it has the effect of neutralizing the strategic benefit 
of the privilege to a defendant.  Prosecutors do not like the 
strategic benefit that the privilege offers defendants during plea-
bargaining.  The deterring-bargaining rationale is simply a means 
of subverting and neutralizing the strategic benefit that comes from 
the right against self-incrimination by allowing the courts to impose 
a greater penalty to offset any benefit that comes to the defendant 
from revealing the incriminating information.  The effect is to 
coerce the defendant into waiving the privilege while not allowing 
the defendant to enjoy the benefit of the waiver.  The State can 
choose not to bargain with a defendant if it wishes, but it cannot 
ask the court to punish the defendant for enjoying the strategic 
benefit that flows from waiver of the privilege. 
One last factor, as indicated by the court in Shiue, suggests that 
Minnesota law punishes defendants conditionally for 
concealment.170  The court stated that “by including concealment as 
an aggravating factor, the authorities or counsel for an accused are 
in a position to advise that such refusal may lead to an increased 
sentence.”171  Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine what the 
court is referring to with the words “such refusal.”  The most likely 
interpretation is that the authorities can warn a defendant that 
there will be an increased sentence for refusal to reveal the location 
of the body.  Assuming that this is the case, Minnesota law punishes 
defendants conditionally for their failure to reveal the location of 
the body.  Both the rationales of the court and the language of the 
court in Shiue suggest that Minnesota’s aggravating factor for 
concealment is a conditional penalty for failure to reveal the 
location of a body. 
 
 170. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d at 655. 
 171. Id. 
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b.  The Testimonial Aspects of Producing a Body 
Some courts have discussed the extent to which providing 
physical evidence to the State constitutes a testimonial 
communication.  Physical evidence is not a testimonial 
communication by itself.172  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that the act of producing evidence for the authorities could 
itself be an incriminating testimonial communication even if the 
privilege does not protect the evidence that the authorities 
request.173 
Some cases have applied this principle to determine whether a 
court-ordered motion to compel a defendant to produce a weapon 
is a testimonial communication.  In Commonwealth v. Hughes, a 
grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of assault with a 
deadly weapon.174  The district court ordered the defendant to 
produce a weapon that the State believed was in his possession.175  
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that compelling 
production of the weapon was an incriminating testimonial 
communication.176  Compelling the defendant to produce the 
revolver would implicitly communicate information about the 
“existence, location, and control” of the weapon to the State.177  
Producing the weapon would also be an implicit authentication of 
the weapon.178  The court concluded that even if the prosecution 
never referenced the defendant’s production of the gun, it might 
have other potentially incriminating effects because the police 
would conduct tests on the weapon.179 
 
 172. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 173. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984).  The Supreme 
Court held that the act of producing a document could be a testimonial 
communication even if the document itself is not.  Id.  Compliance with a 
subpoena could be a testimonial communication under some circumstances 
because the accused could tacitly concede that the papers were in the defendant’s 
possession and that the papers are the ones that the State requested.  Id.  The 
Court held that a case-by-case analysis of the facts is necessary to determine 
whether producing evidence is itself a testimonial communication.  Id. 
 174. 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (Mass. 1980). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 1244. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1246 (“The Commonwealth could use such [implicit statements as 
to existence, location, and control] . . . to secure other incriminating evidence to 
put before the jury, and it can be assumed that the testimonial statement as to the 
location of the gun would be used, mediately, to lead to ballistics tests and 
ballistics evidence and an opinion thereon.”). 
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In Goldsmith v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeals 
considered a similar a case.180  The State charged the defendant 
with three crimes involving the use of a gun.181  The district court 
ordered the defendant to produce the weapon.182  On appeal, the 
court had to determine whether compelled production of the gun 
was an incriminating testimonial communication.183  The court 
followed Hughes and held that “compelled production of a weapon, 
allegedly used to commit the crimes charged, is a testimonial 
communication within the meaning of the privilege against self-
incrimination.”184 
Although the privilege does not protect the victim’s body itself, 
it does protect the defendant against having to make incriminating 
testimonial statements to authorities about the location of the 
body.  Hughes and Goldsmith demonstrate that the act of providing 
information about physical evidence to authorities can be a 
testimonial communication.185  There is no distinction between 
producing a gun and producing a victim’s body, except that 
producing the body would be more incriminating.  Requiring the 
defendant to produce the body provides testimony about the 
location of the body, the identity of the body, the defendant’s prior 
contact with the body, and physical evidence that the authorities 
can use to find additional incriminating evidence.186 
3.  The Incriminating Element 
The incriminating element includes any testimonial 
communication that a person “reasonably believes could be used in 
a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might 
be so used.”187  The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the 
privilege: 
protects a person from being compelled to disclose the 
circumstances of his offense, the sources from which or 
the means by which evidence of its commission or of his 
 
 180. 199 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 181. Id. at 368. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 369. 
 184. Id. at 373. 
 185. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
 187. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972); see also Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 
(1951). 
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connection with it may be obtained, or made effectual for 
his conviction, without using his answers as direct 
admissions against him.188 
It would be incriminating for a defendant to reveal the location of 
a concealed body to the State.189  When a defendant reveals 
information about the location of a concealed body, the defendant 
also reveals that he has had direct contact with the body.  
Furthermore, the location of the body is a link in the chain of 
evidence that could lead the police to more incriminating 
evidence.190  They may uncover additional evidence through 
testing, autopsy, and expert testimony once the body is in their 
possession.191  Revealing the location of a body is an incriminating 
testimonial communication under the right against self-
incrimination. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Leja, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified conflicting 
precedents dealing with the aggravating factor for concealment 
and held that departure for concealment is justified when a 
defendant either (1) bargains or (2) commits aggravating factors 
beyond concealment.192  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a 
State violates a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when it 
compels an incriminating testimonial communication.193  The 
Minnesota aggravating factor for concealment is compulsion 
because it imposes higher prison sentences; it is a testimonial 
communication because it requires the defendant to communicate 
 
 188. State v. Gardiner, 88 Minn. 130, 139-40, 92 N.W. 529, 533 (1902). 
 189. State v. Crutchfield, 771 P.2d 746, 752 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he net 
effect of allowing concealment to be an aggravating factor in the ordinary case is 
to punish the defendant for not disclosing the location of the victim’s body.  If 
[the defendant] had disclosed it, it would surely have incriminated him.”); cf. 
Goldsmith, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (“[P]roduction of a yet unlocated weapon is 
incriminating: ‘The revolver is the supposed instrumentality of the crime, and 
control or possession after the event, taken together with the earlier ownership 
attested by the registration, would tend to establish possession at the critical 
time.’”). 
 190. Cf. Goldsmith, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (holding that producing a gun is an 
important link in the chain of evidence that would allow the authorities to find 
additional incriminating evidence through testing and expert testimony). 
 191. Cf. id. (explaining that when the Commonwealth has the gun, it “will run 
ballistics tests, and these may lead to expert testimony”). 
 192. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
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the location of the body; and it is incriminating because the 
perpetrator of the crime is usually the only person who knows 
where the body is concealed. 
Minnesota’s aggravating factor unconstitutionally imposes a 
penalty, which is prima facie unconstitutional.194  Leja was a step in 
the right direction, but it did not go far enough because the 
aggravating factor, as it exists under Leja, still produces violations of 
the right against self-incrimination.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
should address the specific issue of self-incrimination and should 
rule that the aggravating factor is an unconditional punishment 
directed at the action of concealing a body.  The court should 
make it clear that the aggravating factor is not linked to whether a 
defendant reveals the location of the body.  This would be an 
important step toward assuring the fair and just operation of the 
right against self-incrimination in protecting the adversarial 
process. 
 
 194. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
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